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U.S. Pension System 
John A. Turner
Pension Policy Center
Dana M. Muir 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business,
University of Michigan
Pension systems evolve over time as the economic and demographic
environment in which they operate changes and as human institutions 
and ideas develop. Their structure is infl uenced by competing politi-
cal forces, with differing ideological goals and economic interests. The 
ideal pension system from the perspective of workers may differ from 
that of employers, and indeed, not all workers nor all employers hold 
the same views. Systems in different countries may differ because of 
different national values, philosophies, and economic histories. 
This chapter focuses on the long-run goals that different actors have 
for the U.S. pension system and the differing views on the ideal U.S. 
pension system. It examines the underlying values and philosophies of 
different actors affecting the U.S. pension system, with a focus on pen-
sions in the private sector that supplement the national social security 
system, which are referred to as the private pension system. This private 
system includes both employer-provided pensions and individually pro-
vided pensions. The chapter critiques the current system and suggests 
policy options for improvements that would move the current system 
toward an ideal system.
The primary goals of the U.S. pension system from the perspective 
of workers arguably are to provide secure and adequate retirement in-
come and to cover most workers. In all three respects, the U.S. system 
needs better solutions. With the decline in defi ned benefi t plans and the 
increasing reliance on defi ned contribution plans, some analysts believe 
20   Turner and Muir
that future retirees will have less secure and less adequate retirement 
income than current retirees.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, it discusses the neces-
sity of balancing the interests of workers and employers in a voluntary 
pension system. Second, it examines several recent pension policy 
initiatives. Third, it discusses policy issues relating to the goals of in-
creased coverage, sharing of risks, and adequacy in the U.S. pension 
system. Fourth, it examines the extent to which other goals play a role 
in policy debates. Fifth, it presents specifi c proposals for reforming 
defi ned benefi t plans and 401(k) plans, the major type of defi ned contri-
bution plan. Sixth, it presents conclusions.
U.S. PENSION POLICY IN A VOLUNTARY PENSION SYSTEM
American exceptionalism is the concept that the American culture 
places a much higher weight on individualism—individual freedom 
and individual responsibility—than do the cultures in most other 
high-income countries. In those countries, social solidarity, shared re-
sponsibility of workers and employers, and the responsibility of the 
state are given more prominence (Muir 2006). This difference causes 
the American pension system to differ in some ways from those in other 
countries, with a greater emphasis on individual choice and individual 
responsibility. 
The United States has a voluntary pension system, which limits the 
ability of policymakers to make changes that would be in the interest of 
workers but would increase the costs or risks borne by employers. Em-
ployers are not required to provide a pension plan. Any change within 
this voluntary framework that reduces risk for workers while increasing 
risk for employers, or that makes benefi ts more generous for workers 
while raising costs for employers, may ultimately not serve the inter-
est of workers because it may lead employers to not offer pensions. 
Employers, however, have other ways of adjusting to increased risks 
or increased costs in pension plans, but these adjustments also may be 
adverse to the interests of workers. For example, employers may hire 
fewer workers, pay less generous wages, or provide less generous ben-
efi ts in other forms. 
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Public policy in a voluntary system thus can have the adverse effect 
of causing employers not to provide pensions. However, these consid-
erations do not imply that no changes should be made that raise costs to 
employers or that increase the risks they bear. Often, such changes can 
be made within a balanced package that takes into account the interest 
of employers by reducing their risks and costs in other ways. Thus, 
when considering policy options, an option should not be considered in 
isolation and rejected because of its particular allocation of costs and 
risks. Such an option could be part of a balanced package of changes 
that takes into account the interests of both employers and employees.
INITIATIVES FOR THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM
In recent years, a broad consensus has emerged that changes are 
needed in the U.S. pension system, though a consensus as to what those 
changes should be has not developed. Several organizations have been 
active in encouraging discussion of the ideal pension system. The So-
ciety of Actuaries’ Retirement 20/20 initiative (Retirement 20/20 2011) 
has established principles for the ideal pension system. The Pension 
Rights Center, which is a pension participants’ rights organization, 
along with a number of other organizations, has established the Retire-
ment USA initiative, which has also established principles for an ideal 
pension system (Retirement USA 2011). Both groups have held con-
ferences and have issued calls for proposals for new types of pension 
plans. The ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), an employers’ group, 
has also issued a proposal for reform—a report titled A New Benefi t 
Platform for Life Security (ERIC 2009). The Retirement Security Proj-
ect, associated with the liberal think tank the Brookings Institution, has 
focused on reforming 401(k) plans using insights from behavioral eco-
nomics about the importance of the choice of defaults by plan sponsors 
(e.g., Iwry and Turner 2009). 
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Retirement 20/20
Retirement 20/20 has focused on the development of new types of 
pension plans. To evaluate proposals for new types of plans, it has an 
elaborate rating system with four key criteria:
1) The plan is self-adjusting to maintain adequate funding 
and automatically adjusts to changing economic and de-
mographic conditions.
2) The plan aligns roles of different stakeholders with their 
skills.
3) The plan recognizes new norms for work and retire-
ment, so that it could support fl exible work arrangements, 
such as phased retirement or return to work after a trial 
retirement. 
4) The plan is appropriately aligned with markets and uses 
market mechanisms effectively to hedge risks.
The Retirement 20/20 initiative recognizes four stakeholders: par-
ticipants, employers, markets, and society.
Retirement USA
The Retirement USA initiative has three key principles—the re-
tirement system should provide universal coverage, pension benefi ts 
should be secure, and pension benefi ts should be adequate. It has nine 
other core principles. 
1) Shared responsibility. Retirement should be the 
shared responsibility of employers, employees, and the 
government.
2) Required contributions. Employers and employees 
should be required to contribute a specifi ed percentage of 
pay, and the government should subsidize the contribu-
tions of lower income workers.
3) Pooled assets. Contributions to the system should be 
pooled and professionally managed to minimize costs and 
fi nancial risks.
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4) Payouts only at retirement. No withdrawals or loans 
should be permitted before retirement, except for perma-
nent disability.
5) Lifetime payouts. Benefi ts should be paid out over the 
lifetime of retirees and surviving spouses, domestic part-
ners, and former spouses.
6) Portable benefi ts. Benefi ts should be portable when 
workers change jobs.
7) Voluntary savings. Additional voluntary contributions 
should be permitted, with reasonable limits for tax-
favored contributions.
8) Effi cient and transparent administration. The system 
should be administered by a governmental agency or by 
private, nonprofi t institutions that are effi cient, trans-
parent, and governed by boards of trustees that include 
employer, employee, and retiree representatives.
9) Effective oversight. Oversight of the new system should 
be by a single government regulator dedicated solely to 
promoting retirement security.
ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC)
In its proposal, ERIC argues that the issues of health security and 
income security in retirement are so deeply intertwined that any broad 
revisions should address both components of retirement security. ERIC 
uses 11 basic principles to evaluate potential benefi t plan systems. 
Employers could continue to offer their current plans rather than devel-
oping plans to fi t within what ERIC terms a “new benefi ts platform.” 
The platform for retirement benefi ts has three parts: a guaranteed ben-
efi t plan (modeled on defi ned benefi t plans and including the possibility 
of hybrid plans), a retirement savings plan (modeled on 401(k) plans), 
and a short-term security account (which could be used for life event 
expenses or saved for retirement).
ERIC’s proposal envisions benefi t administrators who would com-
pete at an individual participant level to provide plan services. This 
structure is intended to create economies of scale by developing larger 
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pools of plans than individual employers, particularly small employers, 
could develop on their own. The benefi t administrators, not employ-
ers, would assume the primary fi duciary and contractual obligations to 
employees. This feature would reduce legal and administrative burdens 
on employers. Tax treatment of benefi ts would be uniform for all work-
ers. Employers would be permitted to retain their current benefi t plans 
rather than being required to switch to the new benefi ts platform.
COVERAGE, RISK SHARING, AND ADEQUACY
This section examines policy issues in the U.S. pension system 
concerning extending coverage, risk sharing between employees and 
employers, and the adequacy of benefi ts.
Increased Coverage and Participation
A worker is covered by a pension plan if the worker has the option 
of participating in the plan. A worker is a plan participant if the worker 
actually is accruing future pension benefi ts. The distinction between 
coverage and participation arises in 401(k) plans, where not all workers 
who are covered participate because they do not contribute, which some 
plans require for participation.
Few countries with voluntary pension systems similar to the U.S. 
system have achieved participation rates greater than 50 percent of the 
workforce. Countries that have higher participation rates generally have 
mandates (Australia, Switzerland) or widespread collective bargaining 
(Sweden), neither of which applies in the United States (Turner 2010). 
Only about half of the U.S. private sector workforce participates at any 
point in time in an employer-provided pension. 
Workers not covered tend to be low-wage, part-time, young, non-
unionized, and work for small employers and in the service industry. 
Women and minorities tend to have lower coverage rates than men and 
whites.
Many U.S. policymakers and policy experts have long wished 
to improve the coverage provided by the private sector employer-
sponsored pension plans. The federal government has enacted numer-
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ous reforms having that goal over the past 30 years. A variety of policy 
issues apply to reforms targeted at increasing coverage.
The following sections consider policy options for increasing pen-
sion coverage and participation.
Mandates 
The policy value placed on individualism and individual respon-
sibility is held by many people and limits the options for raising 
coverage. Underlying many of the policy debates in the United States 
is the issue of mandates versus free choice. Some people oppose man-
dates on employers and favor a labor market with less intervention by 
the government. Those opposing mandates argue they are an unwanted 
government intrusion in the labor market, interfering with the ability of 
workers and employers to freely negotiate employment contracts. 
Some policy experts argue that universal coverage is neither neces-
sary nor desirable because Social Security provides a high replacement 
rate for low-wage workers. They argue that the low level of benefi ts 
paid to these workers by Social Security is due to the low wages on 
which the Social Security benefi t is based. Thus, according to this view, 
the proper focus for reform should be on improving wages. 
Others, such as the Retirement USA initiative, argue that the goal of 
the private pension system should be universal coverage, based on the 
rationale that everyone needs a supplement to Social Security. The gen-
erosity of Social Security is being reduced, with benefi t cuts due to the 
legislated increase in the Normal Retirement Age (rising to 67 in 2022) 
for Social Security, and with Medicare tax increases that are paid out 
of Social Security benefi ts. The reductions in Social Security benefi ts 
increase the importance of supplemental pension benefi ts.
Those favoring mandates argue that mandates are the only way to 
achieve a substantial improvement in pension coverage. Some argue 
that the mandate should include mandatory annuitization of account 
balances and no preretirement withdrawals.
Mandates can have different options, including whether employ-
ers should be mandated to provide a pension, whether they should be 
mandated to contribute to a pension or just offer one for employee 
contributions, and whether mandates should exclude small employ-
ers including household employers of domestic help, such as nannies 
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and housekeepers. Often, proposed mandates exclude small employ-
ers because the administrative burden on them is greater than on larger 
employers with human resources departments and benefi ts specialists. 
Some people who work at small employers may be covered by pension 
plans if they are employees of a larger company that provides a service 
instead of being employed directly by the small employer.
Given that the entire U.S. workforce has access to a tax-favored 
pension plan—those not covered by an employer plan can contribute 
on a tax-deferred basis to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA)—
the question arises as to what the justifi cation is for more aggressive 
government policies on coverage by plans sponsored by private sector 
employers. The counterargument is that few people who lack a pension 
plan actually set up IRAs.
Paternalism ultimately is a justifi cation for much of retirement in-
come policy. Many people do a poor job of saving for retirement on 
their own. Even if they have the opportunity to participate in a tax-
favored pension plan, such as an IRA, they do not voluntarily do so. That 
argument takes on greater weight as a reason for aggressive government 
policies intended to increase pension coverage with the cutbacks in So-
cial Security.
One soft mandate in the United States is found in what are referred 
to as nondiscrimination rules. These rules require fi rms that provide a 
pension to treat lower paid and higher paid workers similarly in terms 
of percentages of both groups covered and the generosity of the benefi ts 
provided relative to wages.
Incentives 
Raising pension coverage has proven to be more diffi cult than once 
thought by policy experts. Tax incentives to encourage participation in 
a pension have long been an aspect of the pension system. With the pas-
sage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
all workers have had access to a tax-favored pension in that any worker 
not otherwise participating in a pension plan can make a tax-deductible 
contribution to an IRA. In the late 1990s, the Roth IRA was established. 
This type of IRA expanded the options available to some workers, who 
pay taxes on their contributions but receive their benefi ts tax free. In 
a traditional IRA, the pattern is reversed, with qualifying workers not 
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paying taxes on contributions, but receiving taxable benefi ts. Yet, even 
with this expansion in options, relatively few workers have set up ac-
counts in either type of IRA for the purpose of contributing to them. 
Account balances in IRAs have grown considerably, but that is largely a 
result of contributions from rollovers from 401(k) plans made by work-
ers changing jobs. 
Many employers have added a further incentive for workers to 
participate in the defi ned contribution plans they provide by match-
ing contributions in 401(k) plans. Some employers do this because of 
nondiscrimination rules, which require that a minimum percentage of 
low-wage workers participate or that the employer provide either a con-
tribution to all employees or a minimum matching contribution. Still, 
roughly a quarter of workers who have the opportunity to participate in 
those plans forgo both the tax incentive and the matching contribution 
(Turner and Verma 2007). 
New types of plans 
A major example of reforms to improve coverage has been the en-
ablement of new types of pension plans. Some reforms have provided 
new types of pensions for small employers, such as the Simplifi ed Em-
ployee Pension and the Savings Incentive Match Plan, recognizing that 
the pension coverage rate for small employers is low and that the ad-
ministrative and compliance costs per employee of providing pensions 
are higher than they are for large employers. These reforms have sought 
to reduce the regulatory burden placed on small employers relative to 
large employers. Based on limited data available, it appears that the 
rate of participation in Simplifi ed Employee Pension plans has never 
exceeded 2 percent of all employees who participate in pension plans at 
small employers (EBRI 2009, Table 10.1c). 
Ironically, the most popular type of pension plan currently in the 
United States in terms of the number of workers participating, the 
401(k) plan, was not established to improve coverage. Instead, it was 
an unexpected outgrowth of a technical amendment expected to have 
limited consequences. When employers provide a defi ned benefi t plan, 
workers are automatically covered, but when they provide a 401(k) plan, 
worker coverage generally depends on the willingness of the worker to 
contribute to the plan. Thus, the problem of workers not participating in 
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a pension plan is due both to employers not offering plans and workers 
not always participating when offered.
Automatic enrollment and defaults in 401(k) plans
In recent years, as an outcome of the development of behavioral 
economics, attention has focused on psychological, rather than eco-
nomic, reasons for why some workers do not participate in pension 
plans. This approach has led to the development of the use of defaults 
to encourage participation in 401(k) plans. With this approach, workers 
are covered by default, with the option to opt out, rather than the tradi-
tional approach, where the default is that workers are not covered unless 
they take an action to enroll. Once covered, inertia may keep workers 
covered, though the long-term effects of defaults are not known, and 
may be considerably less favorable than expected, especially for low-
income workers, who tend to cash out their pensions at job change. 
In recent years, legislation (the Pension Protection Act of 2006) and 
regulations have facilitated employers’ ability to offer automatic en-
rollment, where newly hired employees are automatically enrolled but 
have a period of time in which they can opt out without penalty. While 
some data for a few fi rms show a large short-term effect of automatic 
enrollment increasing the percentage of workers participating, longer 
term studies taking into account leakage due to cash-outs at job change 
have not been conducted to analyze the longer term effects. Automatic 
enrollment may result in some low-wage workers paying tax penalties 
because they accumulate account balances that they did not really want 
and that they liquidate at job change. 
Recent discussion has focused on requiring that employers offer 
pension plans and that those plans have automatic enrollment.
Confl icting goals 
Other policy goals have confl icted with the goal of raising cover-
age. The effects of these goals on policy outcomes may account in part 
for the failure of reforms that were intended to raise coverage. 
First, the government has attempted to limit the tax loss (sometimes 
called tax expenditure) for providing pensions, in particular by limiting 
contributions to fund defi ned benefi t plans and limiting the generosity 
of benefi ts provided to higher income workers, typically high level ex-
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ecutives. Because of the limitation applicable to high-income workers 
in tax-favored defi ned benefi t and defi ned contribution plans, employ-
ers have developed nonqualifi ed plans (plans with more limited tax 
preferences) for those workers. As a result, company executives have 
less of a stake in the plan for rank-and-fi le workers, and the rank-and-
fi le plans may be less generous than they otherwise would be. In an 
ideal pension system, the interests of the executives of a company with 
respect to the company pension plan would be aligned with the interests 
of the rank-and-fi le workers.
Economists argue that the cost of providing pension benefi ts is ulti-
mately borne by workers through reduced wages and other nonpension 
compensation, even if the expense is directly paid for by employers. 
This concept is viewed with skepticism by many non-economists. 
While that relationship between wages and pensions is clearly visible 
in the context of collective bargaining, where negotiators bargain for 
more generous pensions in exchange for less in other forms of com-
pensation, most economists believe that it also occurs in other labor 
market contexts as well. Thus, if low-wage workers were covered by a 
pension, their already low wages would be reduced even further, only 
constrained by minimum wage laws. Raising the costs of employing 
workers by providing them with pension benefi ts could lead to a reduc-
tion in employment for low-wage workers to the extent that their wages 
could not be reduced due to minimum wage laws. It could lead to a 
reduction in other benefi ts, such as vacation time or health benefi ts for 
those who have those benefi ts.
To deal with these potential problems, proposals to extend coverage 
to low-wage workers often involve a government subsidy of the cost of 
the coverage, so that the cost would not be borne by either the employee 
or the employer, but by taxpayers. The United States currently has the 
Saver’s Credit for low-wage workers. It is a tax credit that benefi ts low-
wage workers who have a tax liability, but it does not benefi t the many 
low-wage workers who are exempt from paying income taxes because 
of their low income. For this reason, advocates have long argued for a 
refundable Saver’s Credit that would be paid even to workers who owe 
no personal income taxes.
In sum, increasing pension coverage in the United States has proven
to be diffi cult. The diffi culties arise in part because of the voluntary 
nature of the U.S. pension system. Confl icting goals have doubtless 
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also played a role. However, the ideal U.S. pension system would have 
higher coverage than that provided by the current system.
Risk Sharing 
Risk is a fundamental aspect of pension systems. Because pension 
plans promise to pay benefi ts at a future date, risk is inherent. The risks 
include fi nancial market risk associated with the investments of the 
plans, portability risk experienced by job changers and workers who are 
laid off, interest rate risk associated with converting investments into 
annuities, longevity risk associated with the length of life after retire-
ment, and infl ation risk for the accrual of pension benefi ts and the value 
of pension benefi ts in payment. Also, in the context of a voluntary pen-
sion system, participants face risks as to plan terminations or freezes, 
and other plan amendments by employers.
The policy goal of risk sharing is to allocate risks between workers 
and plan sponsors in a way so that they are borne by the party best able 
to do so, taking into account the costs of risk bearing and the degree of 
risk aversion of workers and employers. Diversifi cation is a fundamen-
tal concept in the sharing of risks. By diversifying through combining 
risks that are not perfectly correlated, risks can be reduced. This applies 
both for fi nancial market risks and demographic risks. 
One aspect of diversifi cation of risks for workers in pension sys-
tems is to increase the number of workers who participate in both a 
defi ned benefi t and defi ned contribution plan. Workers are subject to 
different risks in defi ned benefi t and defi ned contribution plans. In de-
fi ned benefi t plans, they are subject to labor market risks, such as that 
of being laid off. This is a risk because the wages used to calculate 
benefi ts in the United States are not price indexed up to the point of 
retirement, so they erode in value with infl ation. In defi ned contribution 
plans, workers are subject to capital market risks on the investments in 
their account. By participating in both types of plans, they are able to 
diversify and reduce the total amount of risk that they bear. 
Another concept in risk bearing is that risks should be borne by the 
party who can most easily bear them. Idiosyncratic life expectancy risk 
is the risk that an individual will live longer than expected. Idiosyn-
cratic life expectancy risk is a major risk for individuals in defi ned ben-
efi t plans that are not indexed for infl ation. Sponsors of large defi ned 
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benefi t pension plans, however, can more easily bear this risk through 
having a pool of many participants. 
Cohort life expectancy risk is the risk that on average people in 
a birth cohort will live longer than expected. Cohort life expectancy 
risk is expensive for defi ned benefi t plan sponsors to bear because they 
cannot diversify it away. However, it can relatively easily be borne by 
individual workers because improvements in life expectancy tend to 
occur gradually over time and because workers are the prime benefi -
ciaries of the improvements. This risk is not borne by plan sponsors in 
defi ned contribution plans because those annuities are determined by 
taking into account cohort improvements in life expectancy. Cohort life 
expectancy risk is currently borne by plan sponsors in defi ned benefi t 
plans, but defi ned benefi t plans could be structured so that it is borne 
by participants.
In sum, risk sharing is a complex topic involving issues of risk di-
versifi cation and consideration of which party is best able to bear risks. 
Policies relating to risk sharing need to take into account the voluntary 
nature of the U.S. pension system and that shifting nondiversifi able 
risks to employers reduces specifi c risks that workers bear but may in-
crease the risk that employers will terminate plans, reduce employment, 
or decrease wages or other benefi ts. Arguably, in an ideal pension sys-
tem, risk sharing could be improved by shifting cohort life expectancy 
risk to workers in defi ned benefi t plans.
Adequacy
The percentage of old-age individuals living in poverty is high in 
the United States compared to the levels in many other OECD countries. 
That result occurs in part because the U.S. Social Security program 
provides a relatively low replacement rate as compared to that in many 
other OECD countries. 
Replacement rates are a common measure of benefi t adequacy, but 
policy analysts differ as to what level they should be. Many people 
view a replacement rate of between 70 and 80 percent of preretirement 
earnings as adequate, but some argue for replacement rates between 80 
and 90 percent (Mitchell and Turner 2010), and indeed some argue for 
even higher replacement rates because of the cost of medical care in old 
age (VanDerhei 2006). Others, however, argue for a lower replacement 
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rate, noting that workers raising children need a relatively low replace-
ment rate, perhaps 65 percent, to maintain their preretirement standard 
of living in retirement.
Part of the debate over adequacy is whether the goal should be to 
maintain the individual’s preretirement standard of living or to match 
the standard of living for a particular cohort group such as current work-
ers in the individual’s job or industry. As the U.S. population ages, the 
question of adequacy becomes intertwined with the intergenerational 
support issue. If the system of pension support is not prefunded, current 
workers may demand a greater voice in what constitutes an adequate 
pension benefi t. 
Adequacy refers not only to benefi ts received at the point of re-
tirement, but also to benefi ts received during the length of retirement. 
Most policy experts feel that more Americans should annuitize at least 
part of their 401(k) plan account balances (Iwry and Turner 2009). 
However, relatively few experts have opted in favor of mandating the 
annuitization of account balances, though some policy experts favor 
that approach.
In sum, while the measures for improving coverage and the al-
location of risk are relatively straightforward, the issue of adequacy 
involves determining standards for which there is not agreement among 
policy experts. This lack of agreement may be partially the result of the 
need for more research to determine how standards of adequacy would 
differ among people in different situations, such as childless couples 
as compared to single parents or couples facing the expenses of raising 
children. Nonetheless, in the view of many policy experts, the ideal 
U.S. pension system would involve higher levels of pensions for older 
Americans, which implies the commitment of greater resources to the 
pension system, and a lower percentage of older Americans living in 
poverty.
OTHER GOALS
In addition to the three primary goals of coverage, risk sharing, and 
adequacy, a number of other goals play a role in the development of the 
U.S. pension system. 
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Defi ned Benefi t versus Defi ned Contribution Plans
An issue in the policy debates is the role of defi ned benefi t plans 
versus defi ned contribution plans and hybrids in the ideal pension sys-
tem. This issue actually may be more about how to reach goals than 
about the goals themselves, but because of its importance, it is high-
lighted here. Some analysts appear to consider the decline in defi ned 
benefi t plans as an inevitable outcome because those plans are dino-
saurs that are unable to adapt to changing business and employment 
conditions. A number of policies could be considered, however, based 
on the alternative view that the endangered status of defi ned benefi t 
plans is due in part to policy decisions that have caused changes in their 
regulatory environment. Further, some people argue that defi ned benefi t 
plans should form the main part of the private pension system, and that 
401(k) plans and other defi ned contribution plans are not really pen-
sion plans but rather are savings plans. Although defi ned benefi t plans 
currently have few champions, labor unions still tend to favor defi ned 
benefi t plans.
Others favor 401(k) plans because of the large element of individual
responsibility they entail, exactly the reason some people do not like 
them. Policy experts who favor 401(k) plans argue that managing those 
plans is not too complex for most people, and investment of fi nancial 
assets is a skill that people should be expected to have. Others argue 
that people have busy lives, and they should not be expected to become 
fi nancial experts. The empirical evidence indicates that many people do 
a poor job of managing their 401(k) plans in terms of the amount they 
contribute and the investments they choose (Turner 2003).
A major debate is occurring over the appropriate role for 401(k) 
plans. There is widespread recognition of the shortcomings of these 
plans—poor investment choices made by participants, many of whom 
have the opportunity to participate but do not do so, failure to provide 
annuitized benefi ts, and high level of risk placed on participants. A 
number of commentators have called for the retirement of 401(k) plans. 
Opinion differs, however, as to what changes are needed for 401(k) 
plans. Some favor a focus on fi xing these plans, and making them more 
like defi ned benefi t plans in some respects, for example, by requiring 
that they provide annuities, have automatic enrollment, and provide 
appropriate default investment vehicles. Others favor looking for new 
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types of plans, preferably hybrid plans that combine the best features of 
traditional defi ned benefi t and defi ned contribution plans.
Distributional Issues
The system of providing tax subsidies for pensions has come under 
heavy criticism. Because the U.S. tax system is progressive, with higher 
income persons paying higher marginal tax rates, the tax subsidies for 
pensions, per dollar contributed, are higher for high-income than for 
low-income persons. This could be remedied by providing tax rebates 
that are equal across income classes per dollar contributed, a change 
many people view would move the U.S. pension system toward an ideal 
system. Others argue that the higher tax subsidies for individuals with 
higher marginal tax rates appropriately incentivize those individuals to 
participate in pension plans. In some plans, such as 401(k) plans, the 
nondiscrimination rules then require the plan to incentivize suffi cient 
numbers of lower paid employees to participate in the plan to meet the 
minimum requirements of those rules. Thus the tax subsidies, though 
unequal, support increased plan participation and align the interests of 
higher and lower paid employees.
Dealing with Increasing Longevity
Life expectancy has increased in the United States, as in many other 
countries. However, there has been little discussion of pension policy 
adjustments that might be made in response to this increase. For ex-
ample, the idea of encouraging people to work longer and take their 
pension at a later age has received little attention, other than by a few 
academics. While Social Security in the United States has raised its 
Normal Retirement Age from 65 to 67, with the adjustment currently 
being phased in over a 22-year period, private pension plans are more 
limited in their ability to make similar adjustments (Muir and Turner 
2007). Other adjustments could include an increase in the earliest age 
at which benefi ts can be received and an increase in the age at which 
benefi ts must be taken. 
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Financial Literacy
Given the role of individual decision-making in the 401(k) system, 
where workers generally must decide how to invest the account balance 
of their individual account from a menu of options, greater emphasis is 
being placed on fi nancial literacy and on fi nancial education for pension 
participants.
Some, however, oppose this approach and argue instead that less 
responsibility be placed on workers when making fi nancial decisions 
about their pension investments. With this approach, pensions would 
be collectively managed by professional managers, rather than being 
managed by individual participants. Economies of scale would result 
in reduced costs, and professional management would result in better 
investment choices.
In addition, some argue that fi nancial education is not effective. 
Although some workers may be helped, fi nancial education often seems 
to have no effect on the workers’ decisions.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This section discusses policy recommendations for 401(k) plans, 
which are by far the most prevalent type of defi ned contribution plan, 
followed by policy recommendations for defi ned benefi t plans.
Policy Recommendations for 401(k) Plans 
Since the 1980s, the role of 401(k) plans has changed from being 
mainly supplementary plans, offered by employers who also offered a 
defi ned benefi t plan, to often being the only plan employers provide. 
However, the regulation of 401(k) plans has lagged in recognizing their 
increasingly important role. 
Regulating 401(k) plans as retirement plans 
One approach to regulating 401(k) plans has been called the “DB-
ifi cation” of 401(k) plans. This approach calls for changes in 401(k) 
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plans that would make them more like defi ned benefi t plans. These 
changes include automatic enrollment of employees as the default 
(with an opt-out option), default investment in life cycle or target date 
funds, and an automatically increasing contribution rate. Automatic en-
rollment, however, may result in some low-wage workers paying tax 
penalties because they accumulate account balances that they did not 
really want and that they liquidate at job change. 
Clear disclosure of costs 
Participants in 401(k) plans are frequently unaware of the in-
vestment and administrative costs they bear in their 401(k) plans. An 
underlying premise of the 401(k) system is that workers are capable 
of making good decisions concerning investments. However, good 
decisions are not possible if workers do not have easy access to infor-
mation concerning fees. This information is available for many workers 
through the prospectuses of the mutual funds they invest in, but research 
has shown that most people fi nd prospectuses confusing and do not read 
them when making fi nancial decisions (Turner and Witte 2008). 
Increased fee transparency also may encourage employers to offer 
lower cost investment options in 401(k) plans. If employers seriously 
consider the more transparent fees when choosing plan options, the 
resulting competition may drive down fees across the investment in-
dustry. Thus, even if participants do not scrutinize fees, increased fee 
transparency and increased scrutiny by employers in choosing options 
may lower investment costs.
Some policy experts recommend that the fees participants pay in 
dollars, as well as the expense ratio for investment expenses, should be 
disclosed on the annual and quarterly account statements they receive. 
This type of disclosure is done in Australia for plan administrative 
fees and by the Janus mutual funds for investment costs. Advocates 
of increased disclosure believe that the information can be provided in 
a low-cost way simply by providing a standardized disclosure of the 
level of fees paid in dollars annually for an account of $10,000. Dis-
closures should be kept simple, so that they will be understandable to 
participants. 
Opponents argue that many participants will not benefi t from such 
disclosure because they will not take it into account when making deci-
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sions. In addition, participants may not understand the implications of 
the disclosure. Opponents also believe that standardizing fee disclo-
sures for a given account balance may be misleading to individuals with 
substantially different account balances. This is especially true to the 
extent fl at fees are charged rather than percentage fees based on asset 
balances. Disclosure advocates respond that, with increasing account 
balances, more experience with investing, and better fi nancial educa-
tion, larger numbers of workers would benefi t from more extensive 
disclosure.
In October 2010, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued new 
disclosure requirements for 401(k) plans. Plans are required to disclose 
administrative fees charged to the accounts and charges for individual 
expenses, such as charges for taking a loan from a plan account. In ad-
dition to performance and benchmark information, for investments that 
do not have a fi xed rate of return, plans must report the total annual op-
erating expenses of the investment both as a percentage of assets and as 
a dollar amount for each $1,000 invested. Thus the DOL appears to be-
lieve that, despite the added costs resulting from additional disclosure, 
the additional disclosure will be of suffi cient value to plan participants. 
Clear disclosure of benefi ts 
Employees may not understand the relationship between 401(k) ac-
count balances and future retirement benefi ts. This situation could be 
addressed by requiring employers to report annually to employees how 
much their current 401(k) balance would provide in monthly payments 
at retirement age, based on reasonable assumptions. This could be done 
by providing an example, based on an account of $10,000, a stated life 
expectancy, and a stated retirement age. This low-cost approach would 
provide workers an idea of how their account balance would translate 
into a retirement benefi t. Research in behavioral economics has dem-
onstrated the low level of fi nancial knowledge of many Americans, and 
improved disclosure of this type would help some workers have a better 
idea of how much they need to save to meet their retirement goals. 
Opponents of this type of required reporting of 401(k) account 
balances are skeptical of the extent to which such increased reporting 
would affect participant behavior given the strength of the inertia ef-
fects that have been reported by behavioral economists. The disclosure 
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of projected monthly benefi ts also may be misleading and confusing 
because they will be heavily dependent on assumptions, including life 
expectancy and interest rates. Those assumptions may create expecta-
tions that the lump sum account balance can be annuitized at retirement 
to achieve the projected monthly benefi ts. In fact, the assumptions may 
change over an employee’s working career and annuity rates may de-
pend on a variety of factors that are not knowable until retirement.
Leakage 
Preretirement disbursements of pension money are particularly 
a problem in 401(k) plans. Many policy analysts argue that the tax-
favored nature of the money means that it should not be available to 
participants until retirement. Opponents of locking up retirement ac-
count balances fear that lack of access to the money would decrease the 
willingness of employees to make voluntary plan contributions. If some 
access is permitted in limited circumstances to meet this concern, then 
at a minimum, account balances over a minimal threshold should not be 
distributed on job change.
Dealing with market meltdowns
Workers age 50 and older have higher allowed contributions to 
401(k) plans than younger workers. These contributions are called 
“catch up” contributions, based on the idea that older workers may not 
have saved adequately for retirement. Catch up contributions might 
be allowed for all workers during an economic downturn, so that they 
could compensate for the losses in their defi ned contribution plans. Op-
ponents of permitting such contributions for all workers argue that they 
could result in a windfall for young workers whose account balances 
have many years to recover. The increased cost of the tax incentives for 
all workers also may be politically unacceptable during an economic 
downturn.
Policy Recommendations for Defi ned Benefi t Plans
Defi ned benefi t plans have declined considerably in their role in the 
U.S. pension system. Nonetheless, relatively little importance has been 
placed in policy debates on policies that might reverse this trend. Most 
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people appear to have accepted the decline in defi ned benefi t plans, 
without considering the role that public policy might have played in that 
decline. A number of policies could be considered to address this issue. 
Equal tax treatment 
Differing from most countries with private pension systems, private 
sector defi ned benefi t plans in the United States are the only major type 
of pension plan that does not permit employee tax-deductible contribu-
tions. Employee tax-deductible contributions are permitted for 401(k) 
plans and for defi ned benefi t plans for state and local government em-
ployees. Non-tax-deductible employee contributions are permitted for 
private sector defi ned benefi t plans, but those contributions do not make 
economic sense, and are consequently rare, because of the alternative of 
relying on employer contributions, which are tax deductible. 
Extending tax deductibility of contributions to private sector 
defi ned benefi t plan participants would help level the playing fi eld be-
tween defi ned benefi t plans and 401(k) plans. The tax deductibility of 
employee contributions appears to be a major reason for the popularity 
of such contributions in 401(k) plans. Permitting employees to make 
tax-deductible contributions to defi ned benefi t plans would reduce the 
direct costs of those plans that are borne by employers and shift costs 
onto employees. Among countries where defi ned benefi t plans play 
a major role in their pension system, the United States is practically 
unique in not permitting tax deductibility of employee contributions. In 
most countries with defi ned benefi t plan systems, employee contribu-
tions play a major role in fi nancing the plans.
Dealing with rising life expectancy 
The increase in life expectancy appears to have contributed to the 
decline in defi ned benefi t plans because defi ned benefi t plans lack the 
fl exibility to deal readily with this continued increase in cost to em-
ployers (Muir and Turner 2007). In the United States, some plans have 
reduced their benefi ts, but generally this change is only done for new 
hires and thus has limited effect on the plan sponsor’s costs. 
A policy innovation, following the example of the Notional Defi ned 
Contribution plan in Sweden, would be to permit life expectancy index-
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ing of benefi ts at retirement. This policy would reduce both costs and 
risks for employers. 
For each new retirement cohort, the generosity of the plan would be 
adjusted downward to refl ect the trend toward greater life expectancy. 
Under U.S. law, this innovation currently would not be allowed because 
it would violate the anti-cutback rule, which is defi ned in terms of an-
nual benefi ts. If it were redefi ned to take an economist’s perspective and 
use lifetime benefi ts as the measure, life expectancy indexing would not 
constitute a cutback in lifetime benefi ts. This feature would shift cohort 
life expectancy risk to workers, who are better able to bear this risk than 
are employers. 
Linking interests of management to workers 
The tax system could be used to encourage broader coverage through 
defi ned benefi t plans. For example, to tie the interests of management 
to those of workers, the allowable maximum income considered for 
determining defi ned benefi t plan benefi ts could be raised in plans that 
provide coverage to all full-time workers. Another option, possibly in 
combination with the fi rst, could require that employers provide similar 
plan features for rank-and-fi le workers as they provide for executives. 
One change to align the interests of management with the interests 
of the rank-and-fi le was made in recent years to the funding require-
ments of defi ned benefi t plans. If a company’s defi ned benefi t plan is 
insuffi ciently funded and certain other criteria are met, then the com-
pany is prohibited from making contributions to non-tax-qualifi ed plans 
for specifi ed executives.  
Funding rules 
Volatility in employer contributions to defi ned benefi t plans has 
increased due to changes in funding rules that restrict the timing of 
employer contributions. Funding rules prohibit employers from contrib-
uting to defi ned benefi t plans in years when plan overfunding exceeds a 
certain level. Even though employees continue to accrue benefi ts, plan 
sponsors cannot contribute toward the increased liabilities of their plans 
in those years.1 This prohibition on contributions generally occurs when 
the stock market and companies are performing well. Because pension 
plans are long-term commitments and because of the fl uctuations in the 
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stock market, plan sponsors then are required to make contributions at 
a later date. This requirement generally occurs when the stock market 
and companies are performing poorly. The resulting temporal pattern of 
contributions not only increases the volatility of contributions, it forces 
plan sponsors to contribute on a schedule exactly opposite to what they 
would choose. 
To reduce the volatility and timing problem of employer contribu-
tions for defi ned benefi t plan funding, both the maximum and minimum 
contribution requirements can be eased. For example, plans could be 
allowed to contribute 25 percent of normal cost any year, regardless of 
funding level, which would permit them to contribute in years when the 
plan was overfunded. They would still have minimum requirements in 
years the plan was underfunded, but those requirements should be less 
onerous and more within the employer’s control because of the added 
funding they could make in years the plan was overfunded. 
Volatility could also be reduced by higher target funding levels with 
longer time periods to reach them. With higher target funding levels, 
the likelihood that plans would become underfunded would be reduced. 
An alternative approach would be to use a three-year moving average 
of funding ratios to smooth changes in funding ratios and thus smooth 
contributions. This approach has been proposed in Canada. 
Lost pensions 
The lost pension problem is a problem for workers who are laid off 
or who change jobs (Blake and Turner 2002). It can be diffi cult for a 
worker to track down a pension from a former employer, particularly 
if that employer has gone out of business. Both the United Kingdom 
and Australia have made signifi cant efforts to assist people facing this 
problem. 
In the United States, the Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) maintains a missing participants list for defi ned benefi t plans 
that the PBGC has acquired and for terminated defi ned benefi t plans. 
Legislation enacted in 2006 requires the PBGC to extend that program 
to include former participants in defi ned contribution plans and in other 
less common types of plans. The PBGC has not yet issued regulations 
on the extension of the program. At this time, however, it appears that 
the program still will not cover some potentially lost participants such 
as those in non-terminated defi ned benefi t plans. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Pension policy is an evolving product of social institutions and the 
economy. With the decline in defi ned benefi t plans and the increasing 
role of 401(k) plans, improvement is needed in the way pensions are 
provided to U.S. workers. The regulation of 401(k) plans needs to be 
updated to recognize that they generally are no longer supplementary 
plans, perhaps retaining the current, less-stringent regulation, when 
they are supplementary plans. Policies need to be enacted to strengthen 
defi ned benefi t plans by making them more fl exible and improving the 
ways they are funded, for example, by allowing employers more fl ex-
ibility to make contributions to plans during times of high asset values 
and high interest rates. Such a change could help address the issue of 
the volatility of employer contributions to defi ned benefi t plans. Im-
provements in risk sharing could be enabled by legislation, such as 
permitting plans to shift the risk of improvements in cohort life expec-
tancy to workers. 
Note
1. Depending on interest rate movements, plan liabilities might not increase.
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